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 Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion
 By JENNIFER F. REINGANUM*
 A model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented. The
 prosecutor's private information is the strength of the case; the defendant's is his
 guilt or innocence. In equilibrium, some cases are dismissed because they are too
 likely to involve an innocent defendant. In the remaining cases, the prosecutor's
 sentence offer reveals the strength of the case. A particular restriction on
 prosecutorial discretion is shown to be welfare-enhancing for some parameter
 configurations.
 Under current practice, prosecutors have
 essentially unlimited discretion to dismiss a
 case or to negotiate a guilty plea to a less-
 er crime thereby guaranteeing a lighter
 sentence.+ Much controversy surrounds the
 exercise of prosecutorial discretion. While it
 is acknowledged that guilty pleas save re-
 sources which would otherwise be devoted to
 trials, one major concern of opponents to
 plea bargaining is that the prosecutor is in
 an unfairly strong bargaining position. One
 source of bargaining strength for the pros-
 ecutor is simply the fact that the defendant
 is required to deal with him, and cannot
 "shop" for a better deal.
 Another asymmetry between the bargain-
 ing positions of the prosecutor and the de-
 fendant stems from the fact that the pros-
 ecutor typically has better information about
 the strength of the case than does the defen-
 dant. The prosecution has presumably inter-
 viewed witnesses (including the defendant)
 and gathered evidence. In the modal crimi-
 nal case, the time and investigative resources
 available to the defense are a fraction of
 those available to the prosecution. Thus al-
 though in principle the defense may have
 equal access to evidence and witnesses, in
 practice it relies heavily on summary data
 from the prosecution. It seems likely that in
 this case there will remain some uncertainty
 on the part of the defense regarding the
 strength of the prosecution's case. Similarly,
 despite the evidence which the prosecution
 may possess, it seems likely that there will
 remain some uncertainty on the part of the
 prosecution regarding the defendant's fact-
 ual guilt.
 In this paper, a model of the plea-bargain-
 ing process in the presence of asymmetric
 information is developed.2 While the issue of
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 tPlea bargaining is a prominent feature of the crimi-
 nal justice system. According to Alschuler (1981, p.
 652), "it is commonly estimated that 90% of all criminal
 convictions are the result of guilty pleas." Moreover, a
 large fraction of the cases are simply dismissed; based
 upon a sample of 1,382 felony arrests in New York City
 in 1971, the Vera Institute of Justice (1977, p. 7) esti-
 mates that "43% of the felony arrests were disposed of
 by dismissal."
 IIn a related paper, Gene Grossman and Michael
 Katz (1983, p. 752) assume the probability of conviction
 differs for guilty and innocent defendants, and that
 these probabilities are common knowledge, arguing that
 the prosecutor is constitutionally required to provide to
 the defendant all of the state's evidence against him,
 as well as a summary of what is necessary for convic-
 tion (Brady v. Maryland, 1963). By contrast, Albert
 Alschuler (1968, p. 66) claims that "the discovery privi-
 leges of the defense are highly restricted, and even the
 limited right of discovery that the law affords may be
 frustrated until plea negotiations are concluded."
 2Jennifer Reinganum and Louis Wilde (1986) ex-
 amined the problem of the settlement and litigation of
 civil suits using a signaling model. Because this paper
 also concerns legal bargaining with private information,
 it is important to distinguish this paper from the previ-
 ous one. In that paper, the plaintiff had private informa-
 tion about the extent of damages suffered, and made a
 settlement demand which was either accepted or re-
 713
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 the desirability of prosecutorial discretion is
 not resolved in complete generality, two dis-
 cretionary regimes are compared. In the first,
 the prosecutor has discretion to offer an
 arbitrary sentence in exchange for a plea of
 guilty, with a sentence of length zero inter-
 preted as a dismissal. In the second, plea
 bargaining is still permitted, but all defen-
 dants who are charged with the same crime
 must be offered the same sentence. It is
 shown that, depending upon other features
 of the criminal justice system and upon the
 preferences of society, either of these re-
 gimes may be preferred to the other. In
 particular, it is possible that unlimited dis-
 cretion is disadvantageous for the prosecu-
 tion, since it carries with it the requirement
 of sequential rationality.
 William Landes (1971) offered the first
 economics-based analysis of plea bargaining.
 Under the assumption that the prosecutorial
 (and social) objective is the maximization of
 the sum of expected sentences subject to a
 resource constraint, Landes argues (among
 other things) that the likelihood of disposi-
 tion by negotiated plea should be higher the
 smaller is the sentence if convicted at trial
 and the greater is the resource cost to the
 defendant of trial versus negotiated plea.
 Empirical analyses conducted separately at
 the U.S. district court level and at the county
 court level supported the latter implication,
 but yielded support for the former implica-
 tion only at the U.S. district court level.
 William Rhodes (1976) modified the Landes
 model, which is based upon individual
 choice, to apply directly to aggregate data
 which are more readily available. Using data
 from U.S. district courts and Minnesota
 county courts, he found that the ratio of
 guilty pleas to trials is negatively correlated
 with the severity of the sentence offered
 in plea negotiations, and that increases
 in the defendant's resource cost of trial in-
 crease the ratio of negotiated pleas to trials.
 David Weimer (1978) tested a variant of the
 Landes model on individual case data from
 the Alameda County (California) Superior
 Court. He found that the plea-bargain
 sentence offer is an increasing function of
 the expected trial sentence (i.e., the product
 of the probability of conviction and the an-
 ticipated sentence upon conviction at trial),
 and the probability that a trial will be de-
 manded is a decreasing function of the dif-
 ference between the anticipated sentence
 upon conviction at trial and the sentence
 offered in plea negotiations. Brian Forst and
 Kathleen Brosi (1977) examine yet another
 variant of Landes' model, in which they use
 the length of time the prosecution carries a
 case as a measure of prosecutorial effort.
 Using data from District of Columbia courts,
 they find that the length of time the prosecu-
 tor will carry a case is strongly positively
 related to the strength of the evidence against
 the defendant, and mildly positively related
 to the seriousness of the offense (as mea-
 sured by, for example, the maximum sentence
 applicable upon conviction at trial). While
 these empirical findings are all consistent
 with the implications of the model developed
 below, none of these analyses represents an
 appropriate structural test of this model.
 Thus these findings can be taken as at best
 weak supporting evidence.
 One difficulty with Landes' theory is that
 the implications he tests do not strictly fol-
 low from the theory, since the actual sentence
 offered in a plea bargain is indeterminate
 (there exists a range of mutually acceptable
 sentence offers) if the defendant is risk
 averse. Moreover, in this case, the model
 jected by the defendant. Aside from the costs of trial,
 the interests of the plaintiff and defendant were always
 opposed, since the amount of the settlement was a
 transfer between the parties. The issue of primary inter-
 est was how the likelihood and the amount of the
 settlement were affected by various litigation cost-allo-
 cation systems. In this paper, the prosecutor has private
 information about the strength of the case, and the
 defendant has private information about his guilt or
 innocence. The interests of the prosecutor and the de-
 fendant are not always opposed, since the prosecutor is
 assumed to suffer along with innocent defendants. Once
 equilibrium behavior has been characterized, I ask
 whether a particular restriction on the prosecutor's dis-
 cretion in offering plea bargains can improve ex ante
 expected social welfare. Thus the nature of the private
 information, the forms of the objective functions, and
 the questions addressed by the two papers are quite
 different, although there are some obvious formal simi-
 larities. Previous analyses which are primarily relevant
 to the case of civil litigation include Lucien Bebchuk,
 1984; John Gould, 1973; Ivan P'ng, 1983; Stephen
 Salant, 1984; William Samuelson, 1983; Steven Shavell,
 1982; and Daniel Spulber, 1985.
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 always predicts disposition by negotiated
 plea; no trials should occur. In addition, the
 analysis presumes that all defendants are
 guilty, since the objective is to maximize the
 sum of expected sentences. Grossman and
 Katz (1983) admit the possibility of innocent
 defendants and, using an objective function
 which incorporates the social disutility of
 punishing the innocent, they provide an al-
 ternative justification of plea bargaining on
 the basis of its potential roles as an in-
 surance device and as a screening device: the
 optimal sentence offer can induce the guilty
 and the innocent to self-select, so that the
 guilty choose negotiated pleas, while the in-
 nocent choose trial.
 My analysis does not examine the desir-
 ability of the institution of plea bargaining
 per se; rather, it takes the existence of plea
 bargaining as given, and discusses the extent
 to which prosecutorial discretion within that
 framework might be desirable. It is similar
 to that of Grossman and Katz in its treat-
 ment of the prosecutor's (and society's) ob-
 jective function. Because private information
 is one-sided in their model (only the defen-
 dant knows whether he is guilty or innocent),
 a single offer is made to all defendants; thus
 selective dismissals are not possible. In my
 model, both parties have private information
 (which is correlated); with unrestricted dis-
 cretion, offers can be individualized and cases
 can be selectively dismissed. However, the
 regime with restricted discretion is quite sim-
 ilar to their model because a single sentence
 is offered to all defendants.
 In Section I, the basic model is described
 and one sequential equilibrium is presented.
 I argue that this is an appropriate sequential
 equilibrium for the game with complete dis-
 cretion by appealing to the work of Jeffrey
 Banks and Joel Sobel (1987) on "(univer-
 sally) divine" sequential equilibrium and that
 of In-Koo Cho and David Kreps (1987) on
 "intuitive" sequential equilibria. In Section
 II, the alternative game with restricted dis-
 cretion is described and its equilibrium be-
 havior is characterized. Section III compares
 the welfare of the prosecutor (and, by as-
 sumption, that of society) under the two
 regimes, and describes circumstances under
 which each regime may be preferred to the
 other. Section IV summarizes, discusses two
 respects in which the basic model can be
 generalized, and outlines potential avenues
 for future research. All proofs are confined
 to the Appendix.
 I. Unrestricted Prosecutorial Discretion
 In plea bargaining, the key element need
 not be the guilt or innocence of the defen-
 dant (for the prosecution and the court may
 be unable to systematically determine the
 truth), but rather the strength of the case. In
 other words, the case may appear very strong,
 despite the fact that the defendant is in-
 nocent; similarly, the case against a guilty
 defendant may be very weak.
 Let t = g, i denote the two types of defen-
 dants: guilty and innocent, respectively. The
 defendant's type is assumed to be known
 only to the defendant. Assume that the
 strength of an arbitrary case is represented
 by the probability v Ec [0, 1] that the defen-
 dant will be found guilty at trial. The strength
 of the case is a summary statistic of the
 extent and quality of the evidence which is
 available to the prosecution, including veri-
 fiable information obtained from the defen-
 dant (for example, an alibi, the names of
 potential witnesses for the defense). Thus a
 defendant with r =.7 is either guilty and
 lucky to have a 30 percent chance of acquittal
 or innocent and unlucky to have a 70 per-
 cent chance of conviction. I assume that the
 probability of conviction is private informa-
 tion possessed by the prosecutor. However,
 the defendant's type and the prosecutor's
 case are not unrelated; in particular, guilt
 and evidence are assumed to be jointly dis-
 tributed. Let G(r, t) denote the joint distri-
 bution of g and t; that is, G(g, t) = Prob
 {case is of strength < g and defendant is of
 type t }. The expression which will be rele-
 vant to the prosecutor's decision is denoted
 f( (r) and represents the probability that,
 given the strength of the case, the defendant
 actually is guilty: f(r) = Prob {defendant is
 guiltyIcase is of strength g } = dG(,g, g)/
 [dG(r, g)+ dG('r, i)], where dG(7, t) de-
 notes the density with respect to g. Notice
 that f(r) need not be the identity function;
 X7 and f(7r) can differ because different
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 standards of evidence apply in court; for
 example, the prosecutor may impute a higher
 likelihood of guilt than conviction if in court
 guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable
 doubt. The expression which will be relevant
 to the defendant's decision problem is de-
 noted 4( 1t) and represents the conditional
 distribution of 7 given t: 4(D7 It) = Prob
 (case is of strength < 71defendant is of
 type t} = G(7r, t)/G(l, t).
 Although arrest itself may convey some
 information about the strength of the pros-
 ecutor's case (for example, if arrest requires
 that the evidence exceed a certain threshold
 value), we suppress this possibility for the
 moment in the interest of expositional sim-
 plicity. Similarly, one could model the dis-
 covery process as generating for the defen-
 dant a signal which is imperfectly correlated
 with the actual strength of the prosecution's
 case. These two potential information sources
 are discussed further in Section IV. For the
 present, I assume that the arrest process is
 essentially random, with q denoting the pro-
 portion of guilty among those arrested; that
 is, q = G(1, g). The distribution function
 G (7r, t) is assumed to be common knowl-
 edge.
 ASSUMPTION 1: f'(7) > 0 for all S E
 [0, 1]; that is, the better the case against the
 defendant, the greater is the likelihood of guilt.
 Define E,( 18) to be the defendant of
 type t's expectation of 7, given that 7 be-
 longs to the set 8 c [0, 1].
 ASSUMPTION 2: Eg(71T8)> Ej(7r8) for
 all 8; that is, the distribution of (,a, t) is such
 that, conditional on ff E 8, a guilty defendant
 faces a stronger case (in expectation) than
 does an innocent defendant.3
 Grossman and Katz assumed that guilty
 defendants are more likely to be convicted
 than are innocent defendants; Assumption 2
 is simply a conditional form of this assump-
 tion.
 Suppose s is the sentence offered in a plea
 bargain, and x is the sentence anticipated
 upon conviction at trial; s and x are non-
 negative and represented in terms of utility.
 The sentence upon conviction x is taken as
 exogenous by the prosecutor and defendant
 alike. Although in practice the prosecutor
 may be able to influence x through varia-
 tions in the charges brought, I assume that
 sentencing following conviction at trial is
 fundamentally a judicial decision, which is
 correctly anticipated by both parties. One
 consequence of Assumption 2 is that, condi-
 tional on 7r Ee 8, a guilty defendant expects a
 greater punishment from trial-because he
 is (on average) more likely to be convicted
 -than his innocent counterpart. Let k de-
 note the disutility of trial for the defendant.
 I have assumed that guilty and innocent
 defendants suffer equally in the event of trial
 and if given the same sentence. Grossman
 and Katz also assume that guilty and in-
 nocent defendants have identical utility
 functions. Thus my model is a natural gener-
 alization of theirs to the case in which evi-
 dence may be of variable strength. A plausi-
 ble alternative assumption would be that
 innocent defendants suffer more in the event
 of trial and if given the same sentence than
 do guilty defendants (due to the injustice of
 their punishment). This possibility is consid-
 ered in Section IV.
 Events are assumed to proceed in the fol-
 lowing order. First, the defendant and the
 prosecutor observe their private information.
 The prosecutor, on the basis of his private
 information, makes a sentence offer in ex-
 change for a plea of guilty. Then the defen-
 dant, on the basis of his private information
 and whatever inference he draws from the
 prosecutor's offer, either accepts or rejects
 the offer. If he accepts the offer, both parties
 collect the associated payoffs. If he rejects
 the offer, the case must go to trial, and both
 parties suffer a disutility associated with trial.
 If the defendant is acquitted at trial, neither
 party receives any further payoff. Finally, if
 3In the Appendix, it is shown that the distribution
 G(S7, i) = - e[- 7 i ]/[1- ehi] and
 G(S7, g) = (1- q)[1 -e-'g -]/[I-e-'g],
 with hi > h g, satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 for subsets
 8 of the form [a, b].
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 the defendant is convicted at trial, both par-
 ties collect the payoffs associated with con-
 viction.
 Given this sequence of moves, a strategy
 for the defendant of type t is a function
 p,(s) specifying the probability that the de-
 fendant rejects a sentence offer of s. We can
 write the expected utility to a type-t defen-
 dant who is offered the sentence s and re-
 jects it with probability p as
 (1) DU,(s,p;a(s))
 =-P [E(7JI8(s))x + k]-(1-p)s,
 where 8(s) describes the defendant's beliefs
 upon observing s; that is, 8(s) is the set of
 prosecutor types 7 which the defendant be-
 lieves would offer s; note that this is not
 subscripted, because there is no reason for
 different defendants to have different conjec-
 tures about this set. However, the expecta-
 tion is subscripted because the innocent and
 the guilty may assign different distributions
 over the set 6(s) because (7, t) are jointly
 distributed. However, if the plea bargain s
 reveals 7, then the guilty and the innocent
 will have identical (degenerate) expectations
 about 7 given an offer of s. In this case, they
 might as well use the same strategy p(s).4
 This "symmetry" assumption is formalized
 below in Assumption 3. In the sequel I will
 examine only equilibria which are symmetric
 in this sense, but I have been unable to rule
 out the possibility that other "asymmetric"
 equilibria may exist. When the sentence offer
 does not reveal 7, then the two types of
 defendants may use different strategies:
 p,(s), for t = g, i.
 ASSUMPTION 3: When both defendant
 types are indifferent about accepting or reject-
 ing a sentence offer s, they use the same
 strategy p ( s ).
 The objective function of the prosecutor is
 assumed to coincide with that of society at
 large, and involves three goals: appropriate
 punishment of the guilty, avoidance of
 punishment of the innocent and the con-
 servation of resources spent on trials. The
 first two of these three goals are made ex-
 plicit in the following excerpt from the
 Supreme Court opinion in Berger v. United
 States (quoted by Bruce Jackson, 1984, p.
 143).
 The United States Attorney is the rep-
 resentative not of an ordinary party to
 a controversy but of a sovereignty
 whose obligation to govern impartially
 is as compelling as its obligation to
 govern at all; and whose interest,
 therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
 not that it shall win a case, but that
 justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
 peculiar and very definite sense the
 servant of the law, the twofold aim of
 which is that guilt shall not escape or
 innocence suffer. [Emphasis added.]
 Though the last goal-that of conserving
 resources-is more prosaic, it is clearly of
 some social concern.
 If c is the social cost of trial (again in
 terms of utility), one reasonable utility func-
 tion for the prosecutor is the difference (in
 expected value terms) between the social val-
 uation of the disutility of the guilty and the
 social valuation of the disutility of the in-
 nocent, less the social disutility of court costs.
 Therefore assume that society values disutil-
 ity d > 0 to a guilty defendant at yd and
 disutility d to an innocent defendant at
 -Xd, where y, X > O. A strategy for the
 prosecutor is a function s(7) specifying the
 sentence offered when the case is of strength
 7. Then expected prosecutor utility from a
 case of strength 7T when a sentence of s is
 4One reason to expect both types of defendant to use
 the same function p(s) is that defense attorneys are
 responsible for "decoding" the sentence offer and advis-
 ing the defendant about its acceptability. Since the
 defense attorney is also unable to verify the guilt or
 innocence of his client, he minimizes his own costs by
 describing a single function p(s), rather than describing
 one function for innocent defendants and another for
 guilty defendants. Since both types of defendant will be
 indifferent when the equilibrium sentence offer reveals
 ST, neither would be willing to pay more for two alterna-
 tives than for the single alternative.
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 offered can be written5'6
 (2) PU(1J, s; pg(s), pi(s))
 = f(T){ pg(s)[-c+?y(x +?k)]
 +[1 pg(s)]ys} +(1-f(T))
 x {pi(s)[-c-X(zXx+k)
 - [I - Pi (s )] As)}.
 To interpret equation (2), assume that the
 prosecutor has observed a case of strength 7T
 and offered a sentence of s. With probability
 f( X) the defendant is actually guilty, in
 which case he will reject the offer with prob-
 ability pg(s), forcing the case to trial, where
 the prosecutor suffers the disutility of trial c
 but gains the expected utility of punishing a
 guilty defendant y(7x + k). With probabil-
 ity 1 - pg(s) the defendant accepts the offer,
 yielding prosecutor utility of ys. With prob-
 ability 1 - f(7r), the defendant is innocent,
 in which case he will reject the offer with
 probability pi(s), forcing the case to trial,
 where the prosecutor suffers the expected
 loss of punishing an innocent defendant
 A(rx + k) as well as the disutility of trial c.
 With probability 1- pi(s) the defendant
 accepts the offer, yielding a utility loss of Xs
 for the prosecutor. When both defendant
 types use the same strategy p(s), this sim-
 plifies to
 (3) PU(,r, s; p (s))
 = p(s)[- c+ aQ(7)(Qrx + k)]
 + [1-p (s)] a (ir) s,
 where a(r) = f ( 7T)y-(1-f (ST)) X. The ex-
 pression a(r) represents the expected net
 social utility of an additional unit of disutil-
 ity imposed upon a defendant against whom
 there is a case of strength 7T, where the
 expectation arises from the fact that the de-
 fendant's guilt is unverifiable. Notice that
 a'(r) = f'(ig)(y + X) > 0. Define vo such
 that a(vo) = 0. If 7oE C (0,1) exists, it will be
 unique, and hereafter we assume its ex-
 istence and interiority. Also define A(s) =
 fa((s - k)/x)ds; note that A( ) is an in-
 creasing function for s > 7ox + k.
 For a general definition of sequential equi-
 librium, see David Kreps and Robert Wilson
 (1982); for our purposes, the following de-
 finition will suffice.
 Definition 1: A sequential equilibrium con-
 sists of beliefs 8*(.) and strategies (pI*(.),
 Pi*(.), s*(-)) such that
 (a) pt*(s) maximizes DU, (s, p; 6*(s)),
 for t = g, i;
 (b) s*(7T) maximizes PU(v, s; pg*(s),
 pi*(s)); and
 (c) 8*(s) c [0,1] for all s, and 8*(s) =
 { vls = s*(7T)} whenever this set is
 nonempty.
 That is, the equilibrium strategy of each
 defendant type maximizes that defendant's
 expected utility, given the beliefs. The pros-
 ecutor's strategy maximizes the prosecutor's
 expected utility, given the anticipated re-
 sponses of the two types of defendants. Fi-
 nally, the defendants' beliefs are always con-
 5This specification should be regarded as a local
 utility function, assumed to be valid at least up to the
 maximum penalty x + k. Since society has chosen x as
 the penalty given conviction, and the trial process itself
 imposes k, it must be assumed that society believes
 x + k to be an appropriate penalty. Thus it is plausible
 to assume that social utility increases with the penalty
 to the guilty as least until x + k. Since no defendant
 would accept a plea bargain which specified a sentence
 greater than x + k, we need not specify social utility for
 such penalties. But this specification is not inconsistent
 with the assumption that social utility declines when
 penalties greater than x + k are imposed on guilty
 defendants.
 6One vocal opponent of the practice of plea bargain-
 ing (Albert Alschuler, 1981, p. 710) would reject this as
 an appropriate social objective function on several
 accounts. One is that it relies upon the prosecutor's
 estimate of guilt, f(7 ), rather than upon an actual trial
 outcome. "Society should not legitimate the prosecutor's
 presumption that he can determine guilt more accu-
 rately than a court or jury..." Another objection is
 simply that the administration of justice is not to be
 traded off against the conservation of resources. I do
 not deal with this issue here; obviously the formulation
 of an appropriate social objective is an important issue,
 but it goes well beyond the scope of this paper.
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 fined to the set of prosecutor types which are
 known to be possible, and these beliefs are
 correct for equilibrium sentence offers.
 PROPOSITION 1: A sequential equilibrium
 for this model is for the prosecutor to offer
 s* = 0 (i.e., dismiss the case), if X < TO ;
 otherwise offer s* = 7TX J k. Let s = 'nOx + k
 and s = x + k. Then the defendant (whether
 guilty or innocent) rejects the offer s with
 probability p*(s) = 1 if s > s, with probability
 p*(s)=1-exp{[A(s)-A(s)]/c} for sE
 [s, i], and with probability p*(s) = 0 if s < s.
 Finally, the defendants' beliefs are 8*(s) =1
 for s > s, 8*(s) =(s-k)/x for s e [s, s],
 8*(s) = 7TO for s E (0, s), and 6*(s) = [0, 7r0)
 for s = 0.
 Notice that sufficiently weak cases-those
 with 7T < 0 -are dismissed. How weak is
 "sufficiently weak" depends only upon the
 form of the inference function f( 7r) and
 upon X /(-y + X), and not on the resource
 cost of trials. That is, a case is never dismis-
 sed on account of the resource costs of
 pursuing it; this decision is based only on
 the merits of the case. If equal consideration
 is given to punishing the guilty and avoiding
 punishing the innocent (i.e., X = y), then to
 be dismissed a case must leave the prosecu-
 tor believing innocence is more likely than
 guilt (f( X ) < 1/2). If society is more con-
 cerned with avoiding the punishment of the
 innocent than with ensuring the punishment
 of the guilty (i.e., X > -y), then the prosecutor
 will dismiss some cases in which guilt is
 more likely than innocence. The result that
 the prosecution will dismiss cases in which
 there is sufficient doubt regarding the defen-
 dant's guilt is consistent with anecdotal evi-
 dence. Alschuler (1981, p. 708) remarks that
 " .. . when a prosecutor does entertain serious
 doubts concerning a defendant's factual guilt,
 he is likely to decline to prosecute..." and
 Charles Silberman (1980, p. 367) concludes
 that " Most prosecutors believe that they
 should not press charges unless they are
 convinced of the defendant's guilt."
 Formally, the equilibrium consists of two
 portions. One involves complete pooling for
 prosecutor types 7r < 'rO while the other in-
 volves complete separation for types ? 770.
 Under the assumption that when the sentence
 offer reveals the strength of the case both
 types of defendant use the same strategy
 p(s), the uniqueness proof of Reinganum
 and Wilde (1986) can be adapted to show
 that the separating portion of the equi-
 librium is unique. If this symmetry assump-
tion is relaxed, I have been unable to rule
 out the possibility of a separating equi-
 librium in which the two defendant types use
 different equilibrium strategies.7
 Signaling models typically possess a multi-
 plicity of equilibria, some of which depend
 upon the specification of out-of-equilibrium
 beliefs. In view of the potential sensitivity of
 equilibrium behavior to out-of-equilibrium
 beliefs, it is worthwhile examining alterna-
 tives to those beliefs specified in Proposi-
 tion 1. In the Appendix, it is shown that
 one sufficient condition for the equilibrium
 strategies specified in Proposition 1 to be
 supported by any out-of-equilibrium beliefs
 is the parametric restriction 70 < c/Xx. Al-
 ternatively, if 8*(s) is a singleton for s E
 (0, s), then any such beliefs will support the
 equilibrium behavior specified in Proposition
 1. Thus under plausible circumstances this
 equilibrium behavior is "(universally) divine"
 (Banks and Sobel, 1987) and "intuitive" (Cho
 and Kreps, 1987). Indeed, it will survive any
 equilibrium refinement which relies only on
 belief restrictions. Although this does not
 7However, some likely candidates can be ruled out.
 For instance, a candidate in which the innocent defen-
 dant rejects s when indifferent while a guilty defendant
 randomizes would be characterized by F( T) = 'Tx + k
 for X E [0,1]. Thus s =k and s = x + k. Strategies for
 the defendants: Pi (s) = pg(s ) = I for s > -, fi (s ) = 1
 and fg(s)=1-exp{ y(s-s)/c} for scE[s,s] and
 pj(s) = j3g(s) = 0 for s E [0, s) are supported by the
 beliefs 8(s) = (s - k)/x for s E [s, s] and for arbi-
 trary out-of-equilibrium beliefs 8(s) 5 [0,1]. Although
 F(ir) provides a stationary point of PU(7T, s; k(s),
 pji(s)), it does not provide a maximum for r sufficient-
 ly near 0. To see this, note that PU(7r, j(97); pg(i(7))),
 pji = a () = 9(,g) - [f(T)fg(.ig(7T)) + (1 -f())]c,
 while PU(iT,0; g(0), ii(O)) = 0. Evaluating both expres-
 sions at 7T = 0 implies that PU(O,O;fg(0), j(0)) >
 PU(O, F(O); fg(9(O)), p(&i(O))), if and only if 0> a(0)s
 -[1 - f(0)]c. Since a(0) < 0, the inequality holds. Thus
 prosecutors with sufficiently weak cases (i.e., s7 suffi-
 ciently near 0) would prefer s = 0 to s( v7).
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 imply that this is the unique such equi-
 librium, it does suggest that it is a highly
 plausible one which deserves consideration
 and close inspection.
 Another expression of interest is the equi-
 librium probability of trial as a function of
 the strength of the case. This is the composi-
 tion of the equilibrium probability of rejec-
 tion and the equilibrium sentence offer:
 p (7T) = p * (s * ()).
 (4) p(7T)=1
 - exp [A(s)A(S*(7T))]/ Ic
 PROPOSITION 2: (a) For s e (s, s), the
 equilibrium probability of rejection p*(s) in-
 creases with an increase in the sentence s
 offered in exchange for a guilty plea, and the
 social weight -y given to the guilty defendant's
 disutility; p*(s) decreases with an increase in
 the social cost of trial c, the defendant's dis-
 utility of trial k, the sentence anticipated upon
 conviction at trial x, and the social weight X
 given to the innocent defendant's disutility.
 (b) For E [To, 1], the equilibrium sentence
 S*( 7) offered in exchange for a plea of guilty
 increases with an increase in the strength of
 the case g, the sentence anticipated upon con-
 viction at trial x, and the defendant's disutil-
 ity of trial k. It is unaffected by the parame-
 ters c, y, and X.
 (c) For ir E (go, 1], the equilibrium prob-
 ability of trial p ( 7) increases with the strength
 of the case r, and the social weight y given to
 the guilty defendant's disutility; p(gr) de-
 creases with an increase in the social cost of
 trial c, and the social weight X given to the
 innocent defendant's disutility. The effects of
 k and x upon p ( ) are indeterminate because
 there are two conflicting effects; the direct
 effect is to reduce the probability that a given
 sentence offer s is rejected, but the indirect
 effect is to raise the equilibrium sentence offer
 s* which in turn increases the likelihood of
 rejection.
 An important implication of equilibrium
 is that when a case is not dismissed, the
 likelihood that is will be resolved by a guilty
 plea is greater the weaker is the case. This is
 one plausible interpretation of Alschuler's
 (1968, p. 60) statement that "...the greatest
 pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear
 on defendants who may be innocent. The
 universal rule is that the sentence differential
 between guilty-plea and trial defendants in-
 creases in direct proportion to the likelihood
 of acquittal," where the "sentence differen-
 tial" is defined as the difference between the
 sentence upon conviction x and the realized
 sentence s*(7). The reader should note that
 I quote Alschuler's statement in order to
 invoke its empirical claim, without neces-
 sarily endorsing his terminology or his inter-
 pretation of plea bargaining as the use of
 pressure tactics. As I remarked in the intro-
 ductory discussion, the comparative statics
 implications of this model are also consistent
 with the empirical findings of Forst and
Brosi, 1977; Landes, 1971; Rhodes, 1976;
 and Weimer, 1978.
 II. Restricted Prosecutorial Discretion
 The model of Section I involved consider-
 able discretion upon the part of the prosecu-
 tor. It has been argued that such discretion is
 undesirable because it gives rise to horizon-
 tal inequities: defendants charged with the
 same crime and subject to the same penalties
 upon conviction are offered different sen-
 tences in plea negotiations. As Alschuler
 (1968, p. 60) puts it, " the practice of
 bargaining hardest when the case is weakest
 leads to grossly disparate treatment for iden-
 tical offenders" (where by "bargaining hard-
 est" he means offering the greatest sentence
 differential between trial and negotiated
 plea). Such " inequities" are eliminated if
 prosecutors are constrained to offer the same
 plea bargain to all such defendants. Econ-
 omists and some legal scholars (for example,
 Thomas Church, 1979) are likely to reject
 this notion of horizontal inequity by arguing
 that defendants who face a different prob-
 ability of conviction are indeed "different"
 defendants, or by invoking an alternative
 notion of ex ante horizontal equity. While
 this controversy is lively and interesting, in
 Section III, I examine an alternative ra-
 tionale for such a constraint; I ask whether it
 can improve the prosecutor's (and society's)
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 ex ante expected utility.8 In order to answer
 this question, it is first necessary to char-
 acterize equilibrium behavior in a regime of
 restricted discretion.
 When the prosecutor is required to offer
 the same sentence to every defendant who is
 charged with the same crime, independent of
 the strength of the prosecution's case, he
 must make a "pooling" offer. This can result
 in self-selection by the guilty and inno-
 cent defendants, because they have different
 ex ante expected values of 7. Let Et denote
 the defendant of type t's prior expectation
 over 7T:
 Et= f7TdD(71t).
 By Assumption 2, Eg ? Ei; the guilty defen-
 dant expects a greater likelihood of convic-
 tion than does the innocent defendant.
 If a pooled offer s is made, it is the
 expectation Et which governs the defendant's
 decision.
 DUt(s, p; [0,1]) =-p(Etx + k)-(1- p)s.
 The innocent defendant rejects s if and
 only if s > so = Eix + k, while the guilty de-
 fendant rejects s if and only if s > so = Egx
 + k. Thus any offer s E (so, s?] will be re-
 jected by the innocent and accepted by the
 guilty.
 The prosecutor must determine an optimal
 sentence offer, given the anticipated behav-
 ior of the defendant types. If an offer of
 S (so, so] is made, it is accepted by the
 guilty and rejected by the innocent; thus the
 best such offer is s = so, which yields ex ante
 expected prosecutor utility
 (5) U1=qyso-(1-q)[c+X(Eix+k)].
 Any offer s > so is rejected by all defen-
 dants, yielding ex ante expected prosecutor
 utility
 (6) U2=-c+qy(Egx+k)
 -(1-q) X(Eix + k).
 Finally, an offer s < so is accepted by all
 defendants, yielding ex ante expected pros-
 ecutor utility
 (7) U3(s) = [qy - (1 - q) X] s.
 When qy - (1 - q) X > 0, the optimal such
 offer is so; when qy - (1 - q) X < 0, the opti-
 mal such offer is s = 0 (i.e., dismiss all cases).
 When qy - (1- q) X = 0, any offer is [0, s0] is
 optimal. A comparison of equations (5), (6),
 and (7) yields the following characterization
 of equilibrium with restricted discretion.
 PROPOSITION 3: (A) Suppose that
 Xx(Eg - E) < c. Define three intervals:
 I1A= [0, X/(X+y)];
 I2A 1X/(X + y), c/(yx(Eg-EJ) + c)];
 and I3A = [ C/( YX(Eg - E) + c),1]. The opti-
 mal sentence offer with restricted discretion is
 s = 0 for q E I1A; that is, all cases are dismiss-
 ed. The optimal offer is s=so for qeI2A;
 that is, all cases are settled by negotiated plea
 at a sentence of so. Finally, the optimal
 sentence offer is s =s? for q E I3A; that is,
 guilty defendants plead guilty in exchange for
 a sentence of s?, while innocent defendants go
 to trial. Expected ex ante prosecutor utility
 with restricted discretion is given by
 (0 q I1A,
 (8) EpUr= [qy -(1 -q)X](Ex+k) qcI2A' q-y( Egx?k) -(1- q)
 x [c+X(Ex+k)] q 13A*
 (B) Suppose Xx(Eg - E) ? c. Define
 two intervals: [I1B = [O,(c + X(Eix + k))/
 8Externally imposed constraints upon a player's
 strategy set can enable him to make binding commit-
 ments, which can improve his payoff in sequential equi-
 librium. What is of interest is whether this particular
 constraint can be welfare-improving. An externally im-
 posed constraint serves to coordinate beliefs and makes
 a pooling offer credible in the face of equilibrium refine-
 ments such as universal divinity.
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 (c+X(Eix+k)+y(Egx+k))]; and]
 I2B= [(c+X(E1x+k))/
 (c+ X(Eix+k)+y(Egx+k)), 1].
 The optimal sentence offer with restricted dis-
 cretion is s = 0 for q E I1B; that is, all cases
 are dismissed. The optimal offer is s ? for
 q E I2B; that is, guilty defendants plead guilty
 in exchange for a sentence of s?, while in-
 nocent defendants go to trial. Ex ante ex-
 pected prosecutor utility with restricted discre-
 tion is given by
 (0 q E 11B,
 (9) EPUr= qy(Egx+k)-(1-q)
 x [c+ X(Ex+k)] q E I2B
 It is interesting to note that when the
 prosecutor types separate (that is, the offer is
 a revealing one), the defendant types pool,
 but when the prosecutor types pool, the de-
 fendant types may separate (i.e., the guilty
 plead at so and the innocent go to trial). The
 screening outcome is much the same as that
 of Grossman and Katz (1983), and suffers
 from the same disturbing feature; the pros-
 ecutor knows that each case he takes to trial
 is against an innocent defendant.
 III. Characterization of the Preferred Regime
 In this section, we wish to compare equi-
 librium ex ante expected prosecutor utility
 in the regimes of unrestricted and restricted
 discretion described in Sections I and II,
 respectively. A convenient characterization
 of the circumstances under which discretion
 is preferred can be made in terms of the
 exogenous expression q.
 Define
 PU*(7T) = PU(7T, s*(7); p*(s*(7T))).
 By the envelope theorem,
 PU*'(7) = dPU(7, s(7); p*(s*(7)))1d7
 = a'(7T))(7x + k)
 + P*(s*(7))a(7)x > 0
 for 7 2 7?. Thus PU*(7) > O for 7 > 7>,
 while PU*(7) = 0 for 7 < 70. The density
 function for 7 can be written qd(D(7rg)+(1
 - q)deD(71i). Thus the prosecutor's equi-
 librium ex ante expected utility with discre-
 tion can be written
 (10) EPU*= PU*(7T) qdD(7T1g)
 + f PU*(7T)(1 - q)dID (7i).
 Note that EPU* > 0 since PU*(7) > 0 for
 7 > 7>o and PU*(7) = O for 7T < 7. The
 expression EPU* can be compared with
 ex ante expected prosecutor utility under
 restricted discretion EPUW to obtain the fol-
 lowing result.
 PROPOSITION 4: For given values of the
 parameters E., Eg, y, X, c, k, and x, there ex-
 ists a unique qo E (0,1) such that unrestricted
 discretion is preferred for q < qo and restricted
 discretion is preferred for q > qo.
 Intuitively, when the arrest process does
 not do a good job of screening out the
 innocent (i.e., q < qo), then discretion at the
 prosecution stage is preferred. On the other
 hand, when the prosecutor can be confident
 that most defendants are guilty, the restric-
 tion to a uniform offer is preferred. Many
 factors influence the comparison between
 discretionary regimes. Recall that in the re-
 gime with restricted discretion, all defen-
 dants accept sentence offers at or below so =
 Eix + k, while only guilty defendants accept
 sentence offers in the range (so, so], where
 s = E x + k. With a sufficiently high pro-
 portion of innocent defendants the prosecu-
 tor optimally dismisses all cases; an offer in
 (0, s0) is too costly in terms of punishing the
 innocent, while an offer in (s0, so] is too
 costly in terms of the trials generated by
 innocent defendants' rejection of the plea
 offer. In the regime with unrestricted discre-
 tion the prosecutor can selectively dismiss
 cases while retaining the ability to impose
 penalties upon defendants who are likely to
 be guilty. Thus discretion is preferred. With
 a sufficiently high proportion of guilty defen-
 dants, the optimal sentence offer with re-
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 stricted discretion is so; since innocent de-
 fendants reject this offer, it is never imposed
 upon them. Since there are relatively few
 innocent defendants, the costs generated by
 their trials and occasional erroneous convic-
 tions are not great. With unrestricted discre-
 tion, there is always a fraction of cases in-
 volving guilty defendants which goes to trial;
 these trials generate court costs and occa-
 sional erroneous acquittals. Thus restricted
 discretion is preferred.
 It is straightforward to determine which
 discretionary regime is preferred by each
 type of defendant by comparing EDU,*=
 - f,.(x + k)d(D(7TIt) with
 O q Cq I1A or
 qE 'IB'
 EDU,r= - (x + k)d4(QDji) q E I2 ,
 {I -(7Tx + k)d?(D7TIt) q GI3A or
 q E I2B'
 for t = g, i, where the sets ijk are those de-
 fined in Proposition 3. For q e I1A or I1B'
 both innocent and guilty defendants prefer
 unrestricted discretion; for q E I3A or I2B'
 both prefer restricted discretion; finally, for
 q e I2A, either both prefer unrestricted dis-
 cretion (for -,o large) or innocent defendants
 prefer unrestricted discretion while guilty de-
 fendants prefer restricted discretion (for ro
 small).
 These results can be combined with those
 of Proposition 4 to show that each of the
 following preference patterns arises from
 some configuration of parameters: (1) both
 types of defendants prefer unrestricted dis-
 cretion, while the prosecutor prefers re-
 stricted discretion; (2) both types of defen-
 dants prefer restricted discretion while the
 prosecutor prefers unrestricted discretion; (3)
 all parties unanimously prefer unrestricted
 discretion; (4) innocent defendants and
 the prosecutor prefer unrestricted discretion
 while guilty defendants prefer restricted dis-
 cretion; and (5) guilty defendants and the
 prosecutor prefer restricted discretion while
 innocent defendants prefer unrestricted dis-
 cretion. For most parameter values, there
 will be some disagreement among the inter-
 ested parties regarding the preferred discre-
 tionary regime, so the exist nce of con-
 troversy is not surprising. When unanimity
 does occur, it favors the regime of unre-
 stricted discretion.
 IV. Conclusions
 The essential features of plea-bargaining
 equilibrium which emerged from this analy-
 sis are that sufficiently weak cases are dis-
 missed, where this sufficiency does not de-
 pend upon the resource cost of trial but
 upon the social costs and benefits of punish-
 ing the innocent and the guilty, respectively;
 that defendants against whom a sufficiently
 strong case exists are offered a sentence (in
 exchange for a plea of guilty) which in-
 creases with the likelihood of conviction at
 trial and the defendant's anticipated disutil-
 ity of trial and conviction; and finally, the
 defendants are more likely to reject higher
 sentence offers, so that the likelihood of trial
 is an increasing function of the strength of
 the case.
 A uniform-offer restriction upon prosecu-
 torial discretion was found to improve
 ex ante expected welfare when the propor-
 tion of guilty among those arrested is suffi-
 ciently high. Typically the prosecutor prefers
 the disposition of cases involving guilty de-
 fendants under restricted discretion, and
 prefers the disposition of cases involving in-
 nocent defendants under unrestricted discre-
 tion (see equation (All) in the Appendix).
 When the proportion of guilty among those
 arrested is sufficiently high, the benefits from
 restricted discretion outweigh the costs.
 Thus far I have assumed that arrest was a
 totally random process. However, arrest itself
 may convey information about the prosecu-
 tor's case if arrest requires that the evidence
 exceed a certain standard. For instance, if
 arrest requires that the case be of strength at
 least sr' then the defendant of type t can
 infer that the relevant density function for S
 is d4Q(7zJt)/[l - D(v7aIt)]. In this case, the
 proportion of guilty among those arrested is
 q( )=fdG(r,g)/
 [LdG (, g) + dG
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 It can be shown that, for the truncated ex-
 ponential distribution mentioned in Section
 II and examined in the Appendix, q'( ,zJ) > 0;
 that is, a higher arrest standard increases the
 proportion of guilty among those arrested.
 Although their statements need to be mod-
 ified (in the obvious ways), Propositions 1-4
 also hold with this specification of the model.
 This suggests that arrest standards are im-
 portant determinants of the institutional
 forms of related aspects of the criminal jus-
 tice system. One effect of low arrest stan-
 dards is to make prosecutorial discretion
 more attractive since low arrest standards
 generate a higher fraction of cases likely to
 involve innocents, cases which must be
 weeded out at the prosecution stage. On the
 other hand, high arrest standards make re-
 stricted discretion more attractive. Of course,
 the arrest standard also has a direct effect
 upon ex ante expected social utility, since it
 determines the number of cases as well as
 the fraction likely to involve a guilty defen-
 dant. The determination of the optimal arrest
 standard and the associated discretionary
 regime is beyond the scope of this paper, but
 some of the relevant tradeoffs have been
 identified. A more difficult task is to incor-
 porate the discovery process. One way to do
 this is to assume that the defendant receives
 a signal which is (imperfectly) correlated with
 the actual strength of the case. If the pros-
 ecutor also observes this signal, then this is
 basically an exercise in updating priors. Both
 parties simply use their posterior distribu-
 tions in their decision making. If the signal is
 private information for the defendant, mat-
 ters could become considerably more com-
 plicated.
 One might plausibly argue that innocent
 defendants are likely to suffer more than
 guilty defendants in the same circumstances
 because their punishment is undeserved. One
 natural way to model this would be to as-
 sume that a sentence yielding disutility d to
 a guilty defendant yields disutility ad to an
 innocent defendant, where a >1. This "in-
 justice" multiplier should be present whether
 the sentence is imposed upon conviction at
 trial or upon the acceptance of a plea
 bargain. Since the disutility of trial is also
 unjustly imposed upon innocent defendants,
 a trial yielding disutility k to a guilty defen-
 dant yields disutility ak to an innocent de-
 fendant. Under these reinterpretations, the
 innocent defendant who accepts a plea
 bargain of s receives disutility as, while one
 who chooses trial expects Ei(,rl(s))ax +
 ak. Thus the innocent defendant's expected
 utility is now simply scaled up by the factor
 a. Since it is not the absolute level of disutil-
 ity which matters, but the comparison be-
 tween the disutility of going to trial and that
 of accepting a plea bargain, the innocent
 defendant's decision problem is unchanged.
 The prosecutor's objective function has the
 same functional form, but the parameter A
 is now replaced by aX. Subject to this sub-
 stitution, the equilibrium strategies are as
 given in Proposition 1. Of course, justice
 might enter the utility function in other than
 a multiplicative manner, in which case in-
 nocent and guilty defendants will likely be-
 have differently in equilibrium.
 These results have been obtained in a very
 streamlined model. Even now, several issues
 remain open. First, there is the possibility of
 asymmetric separating equilibria in which
 both types of defendants randomize, but
 according to different strategies. In addition,
 there are likely to be equilibria which involve
 some degree of pooling. I have taken a broad
 approach to equilibrium refinement, present-
 ing sufficient conditions for the proposed
 equilibrium to be robust to arbitrary out-of-
 equilibrium beliefs. However, the application
 of specific refinement concepts will imply
 particular restrictions on out-of-equilibrium
 beliefs. Due to the difficulty of applying
 these concepts to the case of two-sided
 asymmetric information, this has been left
 for future research.
 Finally, many discussions of the desira-
 bility or deplorability of prosecutorial dis-
 cretion center on alleged problems of a
 principal-agent nature. Thus it would be in-
 teresting to compare these results with those
 which might emerge under alternative pros-
 ecutorial objective functions. For example,
 one common assertion is that prosecutors
 care more about their "winning percentage"
 at trial than about public welfare, the impli-
 cation being that they are willing to try only
 cases they are likely to win. But the results
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 of this paper imply that stronger cases are
 more likely to go to trial (in equilibrium)
 even absent such a divergence between the
 preferences of society and the prosecutor.
 Some conclusions about the likely effects
 of divergent objectives can be obtained by
 assuming that the prosecutor's objective has
 the same form as that of society, but that he
 misperceives the parameters. For instance, if
 he overestimates the social value of punish-
 ing the guilty (or underestimates the so-
 cial value of protecting the innocent from
 punishment), he will pursue cases he should
 have dismissed, and the likelihood of trial in
 each case will be too high. On the other
 hand, if the prosecutor overestimates the so-
 cial resource cost of trial, the likelihood of
 trial in each case will be too low. While these
 implications are suggestive, a more thorough
 investigation of alternative prosecutorial ob-
 jective functions is necessary in order to
 make any inferences about objectives on the
 basis of observed behavior.
 APPENDIX
 Example 1: Let G(7T, i) = -[l- e- h,,]1[1- e -hi ] and
 G(w, g) = (1- r)[1- e-hq7]/[1 - e--h where hj > hg
 and 7r X [0,1]. We wish to verify that Assumptions 1
 and 2 (for 8 of the form [a,b]) are satisfied.
 ASSUMPTION 1: f'(7r) > 0 for 7r E [0,1]. The prob-
 ability of guilt conditional upon 7r is f (ir) =
 dG(,r, g)/[dG(gr, g) + dG(g, i)]. Differentiating and
 collecting terms implies that f'(7r) > 0 if and only if
 dG(7r, i)/d2G(7T, i) > dG(7r, g)/d2G(7T, g). For our ex-
 ample, this inequality becomes - 1/h> - i/hg or hi
 > hg.
 ASSUMPTION 2: (for 8 of the form [a,1b]). Eg(v,g8)
 > E,(Sj38) for all 8. The conditional expectation of 7T,
 given the defendant's type and given that 7T E [a, b] is
 E, (7rl[a, b]) fJ 7Td (D 7t)/[(D(blt) - 4(alt)]
 = a + j { [4t(bjt) -( (it)]/
 [4 (bit) - 1 (alt)] } d 7.
 For our example, [?(blt)- D(Trlt)]/[t(blt)- N(alt)]
 = [e-h77 - e-hbM]/[e h,a _ e--h,]. Since w(h) = [e
 - ehb]/[eha - ehb] is nonincreasing in h for Xr E
 [a, b], hi > h, implies w(hj) < w(hg) for 7 ET [a, b].
 Thus E1( 7rl[a, b]) < Eg( r 1[a, b]).
 Proof of Proposition 1. Given 8*(s), is p*(s) optimal?
 For s > s, *(s) = 1 and DU, = - p(x + k) - (1 - p)s, so
 p*(s) = 1 is optimal. For s E [s, s], 8*(s) = (s - k)/x
 and DU, = - ps - (1- p)s, so any p works. Thus p*(s)
 = 1 - exp{[A(s) - A(s)]/c} is optimal for s E [s, s]. For
 s G (O, s), 8*(s) =ro and DUt = - p(r70x + k) -
 (1 - p)s, so p*(s) = 0 is optimal for s c (0, s). Finally,
 for s = 0, 8*(s) = [0, 7ro); since E,(s7j[O, 7ro)) > 0,DU, =
 - p[E,(g [O, gro))x + k]-(I - p)s implies that p*(s) =
 O is optimal.
 Given p*(s), is s*(7r) optimal? Since p*(s) is the
 same for both defendant types, we can use the prosecu-
 tor's payoff as described in equation (3). For ST <7.,
 PU(7r, s; p*(s)) <0 for all positive values of s while
 PU(7r,0; p*(O)) = 0, so s*(7T) = 0 is optimal for 7r < 7rO.
 For St > 70o,PU(7r, s; p*(s)) > PU(r, s; p*(s)) for s > s
 and PU(7r, s; p*(s)) > PU(7r, s; p*(s)) for s < s (with
 equality only at s7= iTO). So s *(7T) E [s, s] for 7r > 7TO.
 Differentiating PU(Tr, s; p*(s)) with respect to s and
 equating to zero yields
 dPU/ds =exp [A(s )- A(s)]/c}
 x {[A'(s)/c][-c+ a(X7)(jTx+k-s)]
 + a(X )} = 0.
 Upon noting that exp( } is never zero, and that
 A'(s) = a((s - k)/x), this simplifies to
 a (T) (rx + k -s) = c[ a((s -k)/x) - a(7)]
 Since a(.) is an increasing function, whenever the
 left-hand side is positive, the right-hand side is negative,
 and vice versa. Thus the only solution is s = xr X+ k.
 That is, the function PU( r, s; p*(s)) has a unique sta-
 tionary point at s* = 7rx + k. Moreover, the second
 derivative of PU(7r, s; p*(s)) with respect to s is nega-
 tive at s*. Thus s* provides a local maximum. But it is
 also a global maximum because otherwise there would
 have to be an interior local minimum between the local
 maxima, but there are no other stationary points of
 PU(7T, S, p*(S)).
 Finally, we need to check consistency: 8*(s) c [0,11
 for all s. Moreover, 8*(s*(7r)) = 7r for 7T E [ 7rO, 1] and
 8*(0) = [0, 7TO), which is exactly the set of cases dismis-
 sed by the prosecutor (i.e., offered s*(7r) = 0).
 Alternative Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs. I claim that
 a sufficient condition for the equilibrium strategies of
 Proposition 1 to be robust to out-of-equilibrium beliefs
 is: 7TO < c/Xx. To see this, recall that since Eg(7r18(s))
 > E,(TJ18(s)) for all 8(s) (by Assumption 2), if an
 innocent defendant strictly prefers to accept s, then so
 does a guilty defendant. Thus (assuming identical be-
 havior when both defendant types are indifferent), only
 three types of asymmetric behavior can arise: (1) g
 accepts s and i rejects s; (2) g randomizes due to
 indifference and i rejects s; and (3) g accepts s and i
 randomizes due to indifference.
 Consider first the case of identical behavior. For
 s 4 Ou [s, s],
 PU (T, s; p(s)) = p(s)[ - c + a(7T)(7rx + k)]
 + [1- p(s)]a(gr)s
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 for some p(s) E [0,1]. Note that any s > s is optimally
 rejected by both defendant types regardless of their
 beliefs. Let PU*(7) =PU(7, s*(7T);p*(s*(7T))). Since
 PU*(7T) = a(7T)(7Tx + k) - p*(s*(7T))c > a(7T)(7Tx + k)
 - c for all s7 > s7T, no such s7 would offer s > s. Simi-
 larly, PU*(7T) = 0 > a(7T)(iTx + k)- c for iT < s7T, so no
 such s7 would offer s > s.
 For s E (0, s), when the same behavior p(s) arises,
 PU(7T, s; p(s)) < 0 = PU*(7T) for s7 < 7T* For s7 2 s7T,
 notice that
 PU(7T,s; p(s)) < p(s)[- c+a(T)(x + k)]
 + [1- p(s)]a(g)(gOx + k).
 But PU*(7T) = a(Q7)(7Tx + k) - p*(s*(r))c > a(7T)
 (7Tx + k)- c and PU*(7T) > PU(7T,s, p*(s)) = a(-7)
 (7Tox + k) for all -7 > -rO. Thus no -r > -T0 would prefer
 s E (0, s) to s*( 7).
 Recall that whenever 8*(s) is a singleton, both de-
 fendant types have identical expectations and are as-
 sumed to behave in an identical manner; thus the
 equilibrium behavior of Proposition 1 is robust to any
 out-of-equilibrium beliefs which consist only of single-
 tons.
 Next consider asymmetric behavior of type (1): g
 accepts s and i rejects s, for s E (0, s). Then
 PU(q7 , s ;O,1 )
 = f((q) ys +[I -f(gr) [c - X(7Tx +k)]
 < f(7T)y( rOx + k) + [1- f (7T)]t - c - X(7Tx + k)]
 = ((g)(,gox + k)- [I - f (,g)][c+ Xx(,g - go)].
 For s7 >? 7T(, PU(7T, s; 0,1) < a(7T)(7TOx + k) =
 PU(S7, s; p*(s)) < PU*(7r). For 7T < 7TO, a sufficient (but
 not necessary) condition for PU( T, s; 0,1) < 0 = PU*( 7)
 is 7rO ' c/Xx.
 Next consider type (2) asymmetric behavior; g
 randomizes using pg(s) and i rejects s E (0, s). Then
 PU( 7T, s; p(s), 1)
 =f(7){ pg(s)[ c + ?y(7x + k)] + [I - pg(s)]ys }
 + [1- f( - c - X(7x + k)]
 = pg(s)[a(7T)(7Tx + k)- c]
 + [ - px (s )]PU(7, s; 0,1),
 where PU(7T, s; 0,1) is given above. It was argued above
 that for all 7T,PU*(7T) > a(7T)(7Tx + k)- c and PU*(7T)
 > PU(7T,s;0,1). Thus PU*(7T)>PU(7T,s;pg(s),l) for
 all 7T.
 Finally, consider type (3) asymmetric behavior: g
 accepts s and i randomizes using pi (s), for s E (0, s).
 Then
 PU(q 7,S;0, Pi (s)
 ff(ir) ys + [1 - ffig)]
 X {pi(s)[- c-X(7Tx + k)]-[1- pi(s)]Xs}
 = [1- p (s)] a(7r)s +p (s)PU(7r,s;0,1).
 Previous arguments imply that PU*(7T) > a(7T)s and
 PU*(7T) > PU(7T,s;0,1) for all -7. Thus PU*(-7)>
 PU(7, s; 0, pi(s)). The parametric restriction 7TO ? c/Xx
 was used only to show that PU*(7T) > PU(7T,s;0,1) for
 s7 < 7To; any other restriction which is sufficient to ensure
 this could be substituted.
 Proof of Proposition 2. (a) Recall that p*(s) = 1-
 exp{[A(s)- A(s)]/c}. Note that A(.) also depends
 upon the parameters k, x, y, and X: A(s; k, x, y, X) =
 fa((s-k)/x)ds, where a(.)=f()y-(l-f(.))A. It
 follows immediately that p*'(s) > 0 and dp*(s)/dc < 0
 for se (s, S]. Differentiation of p*(s) with respect to
 any other parameter m yields the following formula:
 a p* (s)/@ m
 = -(1/c)exp{[A(s)- A(s)]/c}
 x [A'(s)(ds/dm)+dA(s)/dm-dA(s)/dm].
 Since
 A'(s) = a(,go) = 0,
 sgn dp*(s)/dm = sgn[ dA (s )/dm-dA (s )/dm]
 = sgnd2A(s)/dmds
 = sgnda((s - k)/x)/dm.
 The assertions of Proposition 2 (a) then follow from
 the facts that
 da ((s - k )lx)ldk = a'((s - k )/x)( - I/x) < O,
 da((s - k)/x)/dx = a'((s - k)/x)(-I/x2)
 (s - k) < 0,
 da((s - k)/x)/dy =f((s - k)/x) >0 and
 da((s - k)/x)/dX = -(1-f((s - k)/x)) < 0.
 (b) Recall that for 7T E [7TO, 11, s* = 7Tx + k; the asser-
 tions follow immediately.
 (c) For P(7T) =1 -exp{[A(s)- A(s*(7T))]/c}, the asser-
 tions p'(7T) > 0 and dp (7T)/d c < 0 are immediate for
 s7 G ( 7T, 1]. Differentiating with respect to any other
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 parameter m yields
 = - (l/c)expt[A(s)- A(s*(7r))]/c}
 X { A'(s)(ds/dm) - A'(s*)(ds*/dm)
 + dA(s)/dmi- dA(s*)/dm}
 Again, A'(s) = a(go) = 0, and ds*7dm = 0 for m =
 and m = X, so sgn dp(-r)/dm =sgn d2A(s)/ldmds=
 sgn da((s- k )/x)/ldm for m =y and m = X The
 claims that dp(7)/d y > 0 and dp(7r)/dX < 0 follow
 from the facts that da((s - k )/x)/d y = f ((s - k )/x)
 > 0 and Da((s - k)/x)/dX = -(1- f((s - k)/x)) < 0,
 respectively. For m = k, x there are two conflicting
 effects; sgn A'(s*)(ds*/dm) > 0, while sgn da((s -
 k)/x)/din < 0. Thus the signs of dp(,g)/dk and
 di(gr)/dx are indeterminate at this level of generality.
 Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting for so in equation
 (5), it is clear that U1 2 U2; it is never optimal to take all
 cases to trial. Comparing U1 and U3 gives the following
 four cases:
 Case 1: For q > max{X/(y + X), c/(yx(Eg - E;)+
 c)}, s = sO is optimal; the payoff is given by Ul.
 Case 2: For q E[Xl/(y+X),c/(yx(Eg-E,)+c)],s=
 so is optimal; the payoff is given by U3.
 Case 3: For q [(c+ X[Ex+ k])/(yE x+Ek]+XEix
 +k]+c),X/(y+A)],s=s is optimat? the payoff is
 given by Ul.
 Case 4: For q<min{(c+X(Ejx+k])/(y[Egx+k]+
 At Elx + k] + c), X/(y + X)}, s = O is optimal; the payoff
 is given by U3.
 Actually, when the interval in Case 2 is nonempty,
 the interval in Case 3 is empty and vice versa. This
 allows the simplification in Proposition 3.
 Proof of Proposition 4. Define the function A(q)=
 EPU*(q)-EPUr(q), where EPU*(q) is given by equa-
 tion (10) and EPUr(q) is given by equations (8) and (9)
 in cases (A) and (B), respectively, of Proposition 3.
 Restricted discretion is preferred if and only if A(q) < 0.
 We need to show that there exists a unique qO E (0,1)
 such that A(q) > O for q < qO and A(q) < O for q > qO.
 Note that EPU*(q) is a linear function of q, while
 EPUr(q) is a continuous and piecewise linear function
 of q. Thus A(q) is also a continuous and piecewise
 linear function of q.
 Consider first case (B) of Proposition 3. A(q)=
 EPU*(q) > 0 for all q E 'lB. For q E 12B, A(q) can be
 written
 (All) A(q) = f[PU*(w) - y( x + k)]qd?(D7Tg)
 + If[PU*(7T) + c+ X(Tx + k)](1- q)d-(D(li).
 Since PU*(7T) = a(7r)(S7x + k)- P(S7)c < y(7Tx + k) for
 Tr > rT and PU*(7T) = 0 < y(Irx + k) for 7r < 7ro, the first
 integrand is negative. Since PU*(Ir) > 0 for all 7r, the
 second integrand is positive. Thus A'(q) < 0 for q E I2B
 and A(1) < 0. Recall that A(q) > 0 for q E I1B and
 A(q) is continuous in q. Consequently, there exists a
 unique qo E I2f such that A(q) > 0 for q < qo and
 A(q) < 0 for q > qo. This proves the claim for Case (B).
 Next consider Case (A) of Proposition 3. For q E
 I1A,A(q)=EPU*(q)>O. For qGI2A,A(q) can be
 written
 A(q) =J|PU*(7T)qdD(7TIg)
 - Jy(-7x + k)qdD(7rji)
 +J [PU*(7T)+ X(7Tx + k)](l- q)d4D(iTji).
 For q E 13A, A(q) is as above in equation (All). For
 q E '2A A (q) is a linear function with A(X/(X + y)) >
 0. Thus A(q) either remains positive throughout '2A or
 there exists a unique qo E I2A such that A(q) > 0 for
 q < qo and A(q) < 0 for q > qo. If A(q) remains posi-
 tive throughout I2, then since A(q) is continuous with
 A (1) < 0 and A'(q) < 0 for q ( I3A, there exists a unique
 qo E I3A such that A(q) >0 for q<qo and A(q) <0
 for q> qo. If A(q) = 0 for some qo c I2A, then since
 A'(q) < 0 for q E I3A' A(q) remains negative thereafter.
 In either case, the claim follows for Case (A).
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